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updates from international and
internationalized criminal courts & tribunals
International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda
Victims Critique the ICTR
In the fourteen years since the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) was established, it has made a number of decisions that have angered survivors of the Rwandan genocide. As may be
expected, many of these disappointments
have been the direct result of acquittal
judgments handed down in genocide cases.
This fragile relationship has become
more strained in recent months due to
the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s shocking
move to acquit Protais Zigiranyirazo on
November 16, 2009 (see judgment summary below). Zigiranyirazo, the brother-inlaw of the late Rwandan president Juvénal
Habyarimana, was originally charged with
participating in a joint criminal enterprise
to kill Tutsis at Kesho Hill, as well as aiding and abetting genocide in relation to the
killing of Tutsis at a roadblock in Kiyovu.
In 2008, Trial Chamber III found Zigiranyirazo guilty and sentenced him to twenty
years of imprisonment on one count and
fifteen on the other count. In its recent
decision, the Appeals Chamber reversed
the Trial Chamber’s judgment after finding factual and legal errors in the lower
chamber’s assessment of Zigiranyirazo’s
alibi. According to the Appeals Chamber,
the prosecution was unable to show beyond
a reasonable doubt that Zigiranyirazo was
involved in the alleged killings and the
Trial Chamber erred by shifting the burden
of proof to the accused.
The unexpected move was followed by
another on November 17, 2009, when the
ICTR decided to acquit Father Hormisdas Nsengimana. Nsengimana, a Catholic
priest who was arrested in 2002 was originally thought to have been at the center of
a group of Hutu extremists that carried out
attacks in Nyanza in 1994. He has been
accused of both direct and indirect killings,
and among his alleged victims are a Tutsi
priest and a judge. After a thorough examination of all the charges brought against
Nsengimana, Trial Chamber I found there

was insufficient evidence to indict him and
ordered his immediate release.
As expected, the two acquittals have
angered many in the survivor community,
sparking protests from individuals as well
as survivor organizations. The protestors,
who gathered in front of the ICTR documentation center three days after Nsengimana’s release, criticized the ICTR and
called the acquittals “malpractices.” Others, such as Jean de Dieu Mucyo, the
Executive Secretary of the National Commission for the Fight against Genocide
(CNLG), have attributed the acquittals to
the laxity of ICTR prosecutors. The CNLG
and other similar organizations are of great
value to the ICTR because they provide
survivor witnesses to assist the prosecution. However, the recent judgments have
caused many such groups to threaten to
discontinue providing such services, which
would significantly hinder the prosecution.
With pressure from survivor groups
mounting, the ICTR is now in a delicate
position. The decisions it makes in the
coming months may have the power to
considerably alter the ICTR’s future.
Shahroo Yazdani, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote this
column on the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for the Human Rights
Brief.

Protais Zigiranyirazo v. The
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-0173-A
On November 16, 2009, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTR reversed the convictions of Protais Zigiranyirazo for committing genocide and extermination as
a crime against humanity in relation to
events occurring at Kesho Hill in Gisenyi
Prefecture, as well as his conviction for
aiding and abetting genocide in relation to
events occurring at the Kiyovu Roadblock.
The judgment marks the first time that the
Appeals Chamber has entirely acquitted
and released an ICTR convict.
Prior to the events of 1994, Mr. Zigiranyirazo spent twenty years in Rwandan
politics, serving as a Member of Par53

liament and as prefect of two different
regions. He traveled to Canada to study in
1989 and returned to Rwanda in 1993 to
work in business. “Mr. Zed,” as he became
known, remained influential in Rwandan
politics vis-à-vis the marriage of his sister,
Agathe Kanzig, to President Habyarimana,
whose apparent assassination was the
immediate catalyst for the mass killing of
Tutsis and moderate Hutus between April
and July 1994. Zigiranyirazo’s December 2008 convictions by the ICTR Trial
Chamber stemmed from three incidents
in two separate locations, which resulted
in the deaths of between 810 and 1,520
persons. First, the Trial Chamber found
that he traveled to a Tutsi refugee gathering
on Kesho Hill, where he gave a speech to
a group of officials, civilians, and Interahamwe soldiers just prior to the killing of
between 800 and 1,500 of the refugees.
Zigiranyirazo’s involvement at Kesho Hill
resulted in convictions on separate counts
of genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity, earning him two concurrent twenty-year sentences. The prosecution also presented evidence at trial that
Zigiranyirazo twice traveled to a roadblock
at Kiyovu, near Kigali, where he aided and
abetted acts of genocide by offering firearms and providing instructions to soldiers
there. Between ten and twenty people were
killed at the roadblock. The Trial Chamber
convicted him on one count of aiding and
abetting genocide and handed down a third
concurrent sentence of fifteen years. In
relation to both incidents, the Trial Chamber dismissed the alibi evidence raised by
the accused.
On appeal, Zigiranyirazo challenged,
inter alia, the Trial Chamber’s evaluation
of alibi evidence presented by the Defense
in relation to both the events at Kesho Hill
and the Kiyovu Roadblock. In addressing
this challenge, the Appeals Chamber began
with a general discussion of the burden
of proof in the assessment of alibis. Specifically, the Appeals Chamber explained
that an accused does not bear the burden
of proving an alibi beyond a reasonable
doubt, but must simply produce evidence
that he was not present at the time of the
alleged crime; or, alternatively, he must
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present evidence likely to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether he was present.
In the words of the Appeals Chamber, “[i]f
the alibi is reasonably possibly true, it must
be accepted,” and the Prosecution must
then establish beyond reasonable doubt
that, “despite the alibi, the facts alleged
are nevertheless true.” In order to determine whether the Trial Chamber improperly shifted the burden in a given case, the
Appeals Chamber held that it must look
for language suggesting, inter alia, that
the Trial Chamber required the accused
to “negate” the prosecution’s argument, to
“exonerate” himself, or to “refute the possibility” that he could have been present
when the crime was committed.

Second, the Appeals Chamber found that
the lower court erred in failing to provide
a “reasoned opinion” in relation to the feasibility of travel between Kesho Hill and
Kanombe, which was an issue of “crucial
importance.” Finally, the Appeals Chamber determined that the Trial Chamber
committed error by improperly dismissing certain key alibi evidence offered by
the Defense. Taken together, the Appeals
Chamber found that the lower court’s
reversal of the burden of proof, failure to
provide a reasoned opinion on an issue
critical to the Defense’s case, and mistreatment of key evidence invalidated Zigiranyirazo’s convictions in relation to the events
at Kesho Hill.

The Appeals Chamber then turned to
the alleged errors relating to the Defense’s
alibi evidence in regards to Kesho Hill. As
stated above, the Trial Chamber found that
Zigiranyirazo was present at Kesho Hill
at some time during the morning of April
8, 1994 and that he addressed a group of
assailants just before the group launched
an attack on Tutsis taking refuge at the site.
At trial, the Defense presented testimony
from nine witnesses who placed Zigiranyirazo at the presidential residence at Camp
Kanombe just outside Kigali at various
times throughout the day of April 8, 1994.
The Defense also entered evidence regarding the distance between Kanombe and
Kesho Hill to establish that it would have
been impossible for Zigiranyirazo to be in
both places within the relevant time frame
at issue. In reviewing the Defense’s alibi
evidence and the Trial Chamber’s treatment
of that evidence, the Appeals Chamber
found three errors. First, although the Trial
Chamber correctly stated in its judgment
that the Prosecution bore the burden of
proof, the Appeals Chamber found that the
lower court’s approach to the alibi evidence
“indicate[d] that it placed a greater evidentiary burden on Zigiranyirazo to establish
an alibi than required . . . .” For instance,
the Trial Chamber stated that the alibi
evidence was “inconclusive,” that it “[did]
not contradict [Prosecution evidence],” and
that it “[did] not provide . . . an alibi.” In
the Appeals Chamber’s opinion, these comments established that the Trial Chamber
“did not fully appreciate that Zigiranyirazo
only needed to establish reasonable doubt
that he would have been able to travel to
and from Kesho Hill on the morning of 8
April 1994, rather than establish his exact
location throughout the day in Kanombe.”

Turning to Zigiranyirazo’s conviction
for the events at the Kiyovu Roadblock,
the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial
Chamber committed the same three errors
that it had committed in relation to the
Kesho Hill convictions. First, the Appeals
Chamber again found evidence that the
lower court had shifted the burden of proof,
citing language from the Trial Chamber’s
judgment suggesting that Zigiranyirazo
was required to “exclude the possibility”
of his responsibility for the crime, rather
than merely cast a reasonable doubt on
the Prosecutor’s case. Second, the Appeals
Chamber found that the Trial Chamber
failed to consider, or at least failed to provide a reasoned opinion regarding, travel
times between the roadblock and Rubaya,
where Zigiranyirazo spent his nights during the relevant period of time. Lastly,
the Trial Chamber failed to consider “the
evidence as a whole as well as the relevant
circumstantial evidence” when evaluating
the Defense’s alibi evidence, leading the
Appeals Chamber to conclude that the
lower court had misconstrued key facts
in the case. Again, the Appeals Chamber
found that, taken together, these errors
invalidated Zigiranyirazo’s conviction.
Given the reversals of Zigiranyirazo’s
three convictions, the Appeals Chamber
did not address the Defense’s fifteen other
grounds for appeal or the Prosecutor’s
appeal for an extended sentence. Notably,
while the Appeals Chamber has authority
to remand any issue to the Trial Chamber,
the present judgment in no way indicates that the Appeals Chamber considered
remand appropriate in this case. Upon the
pronouncement of the Appeals Chamber’s
judgment, Zigiranyirazo was released from
the UN detention center in Tanzania, where
54

he had been held since shortly after his
arrest in Belgium in 2001.
Christopher Valvardi, a J.D. candidate at
the Washington College of Law, wrote the
judgment summary of Protais Zigiranyirazo
v. The Prosecutor. Susana SáCouto, Director of the War Crimes Research Office, and
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse
Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-A
On July 14, 2009, Trial Chamber I of
the ICTR found Tharcisse Renzaho guilty
of genocide, murder as a crime against
humanity, rape as a crime against humanity, murder as a violation of Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, and
rape as a violation of Common Article 3
to the Geneva Conventions. Renzaho was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
During the genocide in Rwanda in 1994,
Tharcisse Renzaho was both the prefect
of Kigali-Ville prefecture and a colonel in
the Rwandan army. As prefect, Renzaho
was responsible for “peace and security in
Kigali-Ville.” Furthermore, following the
death of Rwandan President Habyarimana
on April 7, 1994, Renzaho was appointed
to a “crisis committee” established by
the senior military command of the army.
Renzaho left Rwanda in early July 1994
and was arrested in September 2002 in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
At trial, the Prosecution put forward
evidence of a wide array of activities it
believed supported its charges against Renzaho, although the Trial Chamber dismissed
several of the allegations. For instance, the
Prosecution alleged that, because Renzaho recruited and trained the Interahamwe
militia between mid-1993 and July 1994,
the accused bore responsibility for the killings and serious bodily and mental harm
caused by the Interahamwe between April
6 and July 17, 1994. However, while the
Trial Chamber found evidence to support
the claim that Renzaho encouraged certain students to join the Interahamwe and
permitted the group to meet at his house
for the purpose of receiving military training, the Chamber observed that support to
a “youth organization” did not “in itself ”
constitute a crime within the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. It further noted that no evidence suggested that Renzaho “made state-
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ments against the Tutsis” in this context
or that the “purpose of the training was to
kill Tutsis.” In addition, the Trial Chamber
found insufficient evidence to support the
Prosecution’s claims that Renzaho ordered
the killing of certain Tutsis living in Kigali,
such as André Kameya, a journalist critical
of the Interim Government.
Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber found
that evidence did support several others of
the Prosecution’s allegations. For instance,
the Trial Chamber found that Renzaho was
responsible for the events occurring at a
number of roadblocks that were used to
identify Tutsis who were then captured or
killed. Specifically, although it discredited
evidence that Renzaho personally manned
the roadblocks, the Trial Chamber found
that the accused “ordered the establishment
of and support to” the roadblocks, based
primarily on evidence of his statements at
public meetings and over the radio. Notably, while the evidence did not establish
that the accused provided “explicit orders”
to kill Tutsis at the roadblocks, it was clear
to the Trial Chamber that Renzaho was
aware that people were being killed at
roadblocks “based on their ethnicity and
political leanings” as early as April 10,
1994. Thus, it concluded that the accused
“was aware that the continued killing of
Tutsi civilians was a likely outcome” of his
orders to erect additional roadblocks. The
Trial Chamber also found that Renzaho
was involved in the killing of a number of
Tutsis who had sought refuge in Kigali’s
Centre des Etudes de Langues Africaines
(CELA). In particular, the Chamber found
that, on April 22, 1994, Renzaho supervised a “selection process” by which Interahamwe separated about forty Tutsis from
the other refugees. Renzaho then sent the
remaining refugees home, while the forty
persons selected by the Interahamwe were
killed. Similarly, the Chamber found that
Renzaho bore responsibility for the killing of some forty to fifty Tutsis who had
taken refuge in the Saint Famille Church,
as the evidence established that Renzaho
had been present at the church prior to the
attack, had directed the Interahamwe to kill
“many persons,” and later ordered them to
stop the attack upon the approach of UN
troops.
In addition to finding Renzaho responsible for genocide based on his involvement in killings of Tutsis, the Trial
Chamber found that Renzaho’s role in
several instances of sexual violence against

Tutsi women supported the Prosecution’s
charges of genocide, noting that genocide
may be carried out by acts intended to
cause serious bodily or mental harm if
those acts are performed with the requisite genocidal intent. The Court found
genocidal intent behind the rapes charged
in this case because of the surrounding
circumstances, including the targeting of
Tutsis and Renzaho’s comments encouraging the rapes. For example, witnesses testified that Renzaho encouraged the rapes
by saying Tutsi women were “food for the
militiamen,” and telling his subordinates
that it was “time to show Tutsi women that
Hutus are strong and can do whatever they
wanted to do with them.”
In terms of Renzaho’s individual criminal responsibility, the Chamber determined
that he bore responsibility for each of the
crimes relating to events at the roadblocks,
CELA, and Saint Famille Church under a
theory of direct responsibility for ordering and aiding and abetting the crimes, as
well as under a theory of superior responsibility, as Renzaho knew or should have
known that people over whom he exercised
authority were going to commit the relevant crimes, but he did nothing to prevent
the crimes. In relation to the crimes of sexual violence, the Chamber determined that
Renzaho was responsible under a theory of
superior responsibility only. Interestingly,
the Defense had argued that the Interahamwe were so unorganized and undisciplined that it would have been impossible
for Renzaho to effectively control them.
However, the Chamber rejected this claim,
finding that Renzaho was indeed in a superior-subordinate relationship with those
who committed the crimes, not only by
virtue of his military rank, but also due to
his role as prefect of Kigali-Ville.
For sentencing purposes, the Prosecution submitted several aggravating factors
for the Chamber’s consideration, including
Renzaho’s breach of his duty to the population, which derived from his position as
prefect, and the duration and severity of
his crimes. The Defense proposed that the
Chamber consider Renzaho’s long history
of public service, as well as evidence that
he sheltered Tutsis in his house and tried
to arrest wrongdoers, as mitigating circumstances. In weighing these factors, the
Chamber gave significant weight to Renzaho’s position as a civilian and military
superior, holding that these increased the
gravity of his crimes. Furthermore, while it
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recognized Renzaho’s background in public service and his submissions concerning
assistance to Tutsis, it afforded these factors “very limited weight” in light of the
severity of his crimes. In determining that a
life sentence was appropriate, the Chamber
explained that the sentence was a single,
global sentence encompassing punishment
for each of Renzaho’s crimes, which was
appropriate in the view of the Chamber
because all of the offenses were a part of
“a single criminal transaction.”
Aileen Thomson, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote the judgment summary of The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho. Susana SáCouto, Director
of the War Crimes Research Office, and
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Special Court for Sierra Leone
Cross Examination of Charles
Taylor
The Special Court of Sierra Leone
(SCSL) resumed with the cross examination of Charles Taylor, the former Liberian
President, on January 11, 2010. Taylor is
currently charged with eleven counts of
war crimes and crimes against humanity.
He has denied allegations that he supplied
arms and ammunition to rebels in return
for Sierra Leone blood diamonds and helping Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
rebels plan operations in which they committed rape, murder, and amputations.
In early 2010, Brenda Hollis, Lead
Prosecutor for the SCSL, questioned Taylor about allegations made by actress Mia
Farrow pertaining to a 1997 party in South
Africa, which was hosted by Nelson Mandela and attended by Naomi Campbell,
Mia Farrow, and other celebrities. The allegations claim Taylor delivered a diamond
to Naomi Campbell that he had received
from the Sierra Leon junta regime. The
Prosecutor argued the inclusion of these
allegations would refute Taylor’s claims
that he never received diamonds when he
was in the Nation Patriotic Front (NPFL)
or President of Liberia. The use of a
document with these allegations reignited
the ongoing battle over the use of fresh
evidence during cross examination. The
Judges disallowed the Prosecution from
using the document in cross examination.
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In addition, the Prosecution used Taylor’s four-month-long direct examination
testimony to challenge Taylor on topics
outside the indictment timeframe, in order
to test Taylor’s credibility as a witness.
Taylor was asked about his involvement
in the 1985 coup to overthrow the thenLiberian president, Samuel Doe; alleged
money embezzlement; and the reason for
his stepping down as Liberian president.
During examination, Taylor said the 2003
attack by Liberian rebels on an annex of
the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia was what
made him decide to step down as president.
The Prosecution drew attention to the fact
the attack occurred one month after the
Accra peace talks, during which Taylor
had indicated his willingness to step down
as president. The Prosecution also alleged
that in 1999, when the RUF rebels entered
into negotiations with the government of
Sierra Leone, Taylor advised his negotiations team to ensure that the peace agreement would benefit RUF rebels. However,
Taylor denied the allegations.
In the second week of cross examination, Taylor denied several more of the
Prosecution’s allegations, including that
Taylor knew about RUF Commander Sam
Bockarie’s threat in December 1998 to
attack Freetown. The threat was carried
out in January 1999. The rebels committed murders and rapes, burned houses, and
amputated the limbs of civilians. The Prosecution dismissed Taylor’s denial, arguing
that as the point person for peace in Sierra
Leone, he would have been aware of such
threats. The Prosecution further alleged
that Taylor was superior to RUF leaders,
and he knew or had reason to know that
the rebels were committing such atrocities.
One of Taylor’s central defenses during his
trial has been his stated role as peacemaker
during the Sierra Leone war. Taylor maintains that in 1997 when he became Liberian
president, the Economic Community of
West African States made him head peacemaker for the conflict in Sierra Leone, and
that he did not know about RUF leader
Sam Bockarie’s threats of attack.
As the Prosecution continues its crossexamination of Charles Taylor, it will begin
stepping away from demonstrating Taylor’s
untruthfulness during his testimony and
begin focusing on specific allegations such
as the use of child soldiers, physical and
sexual violence, and other acts of terrorism
directed at civilians.

Laticia Sanchez, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote this column on the Special Court for Sierra Leone
for the Human Rights Brief.

Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon, and
Gbao, Case No. SCSL-04-15-A
On October 26, 2009, the Appeals
Chamber for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone upheld the convictions of three
former RUF leaders for crimes against
humanity, violations of Common Article
3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. The
charges it upheld included those relating to
forced marriage, the conscription and use
of child soldiers in armed conflict, and
attacks on UN peacekeepers. It reaffirmed
sentences for Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon,
and Augustine Gbao of 52 years, 40 years,
and 25 years, respectively. The Chamber
dismissed 96 counts of appeal, noting that
many of the Appellants’ grounds for appeal
were vague, unsupported, and undeveloped.
While the Appeals Chamber did grant one
of Gbao’s grounds of appeal, overturning
his conviction for collective punishments
as a war crime, the acquittal on this single
count did not alter Gbao’s overall sentence.
Similarly, although the Appeals Chamber
granted two of the Appellants’ claims of
error in regards to sentencing, the findings
of error did not require that the sentences
handed down by the Trial Chamber be
decreased.
Among the unsuccessful grounds of
appeal brought by the RUF leaders was a
claim that the Trial Chamber had erred in
finding that Kallon acted with the requisite
intent in relation to the crime of conscripting and using children under the age of
15 to participate actively in hostilities.
Specifically, Kallon alleged that the Trial
Chamber had improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defense by holding
that “where doubt existed as to whether a
person abducted or trained was under the
age of [15], it was incumbent upon the
perpetrator to ascertain the person’s age.”
In response, the Appeals Chamber first
noted its previous holding that the prohibition on conscripting or using child soldiers
existed in customary international law at
the time the RUF leaders allegedly engaged
in such conduct and that “a significant
body of conventional international law
imposes an obligation on parties to ‘take all
56

feasible measures to ensure that children
are not recruited or used in hostilities.”
Accordingly, the Appeals Chamber held
that military leaders “are under a duty to
act with due diligence to ensure that children under the age of [15] are not recruited
or used in combat,” and that “[f]ailure to
exercise such due diligence to ascertain
the age of recruits does not relieve an
accused of his liability for their recruitment or use.” Based on these findings, the
Appeals Chamber rejected Kallon’s appeal.
In a separate concurring opinion, Judge
Renate Winter clarified that, in her view,
the Chamber’s holding on this issue applied
the mens rea applicable to the age of child
soldiers codified in the Elements of Crimes
of the International Criminal Court (ICC),
which requires that the perpetrator “knew
or should have known” that the children
were under 15 years old. While the ICC’s
Elements of Crimes are in no way binding
on the Special Court, Judge Winter nevertheless stressed that the standard applied
by the Special Court was equivalent to the
ICC standard.
Another challenge brought by Kallon
was that the Trial Chamber had erred in
convicting him of the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers. Noting that one of the elements
of the crime is that the relevant “personnel,
installations, material, units or vehicles
were entitled to that protection given to
civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict,” Kallon
argued that the UN peacekeeping force
in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL, had “acted
in a belligerent manner” toward the RUF,
thus “stripping itself of any international
protection accorded [to] civilians or peacekeepers.” However, the Appeals Chamber
agreed with the Trial Chamber that it
was necessary to consider the “totality of
the circumstances” to determine whether
peacekeepers are entitled to the protection afforded to civilians and that, in the
context of the RUF attack on UNAMSIL,
the circumstances showed that the peacekeepers did benefit from the protection
afforded to civilians. In support of this
finding, the Appeals Chamber noted that
UNAMSIL was a peacekeeping mission
(as opposed to a peace enforcement mission) that was authorized to use force only
in certain exceptional circumstances; that
the peacekeepers were only lightly armed;
and that the peacekeepers did not engage in
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hostilities or use force, except legitimately
in self defense.
In regards to Gbao’s successful ground
of appeal against his conviction for the
war crime of collective punishments, Gbao
argued that the Trial Chamber “failed to
find that he held the specific intent required
for collective punishment.” In its judgment,
the Trial Chamber found Gbao guilty of
the war crime of collective punishments
based on the unlawful killing of 63 civilians, which was done in the presence of
several senior RUF members, including
Gbao, for the purpose of “indiscriminately
punishing civilians” perceived to be collaborating with the Civil Defense Forces.
Based on a review of the facts, the Appeals
Chamber agreed with Gbao’s submission
that the Prosecution failed to establish
Gbao had the specific intent to collectively
punish the civilians who were killed, and
thus overturned his conviction. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber upheld Gbao’s
sentence of 25 years, noting “the particular
circumstances of this case as well as the
form and degree of the participation of
Gbao in the crimes, and the seriousness of
the crimes.”
Finally, with respect to sentencing, Kallon and Gbao successfully challenged their
cumulative convictions on the counts of
extermination as a crime against humanity
and murder as a crime against humanity.
The Appeals Chamber agreed that the
latter crime is fully subsumed within the
former and thus held that convictions on
both counts for the same underlying acts
are “impermissibly cumulative.” Because
the crime against humanity of extermination is the more specific offense, the
Appeals Chamber held that the convictions for the relevant killings would stand
under extermination as a crime against
humanity, but not under murder as a crime
against humanity. The Appeals Chamber
also agreed that the Trial Chamber “erroneously double-counted” evidence of the
Appellants’ specific intent in relation to
the war crimes of terrorism and collective punishments. Specifically, the Trial
Chamber erred in considering the specific
intent to terrorize or collectively punish
as increasing the gravity of the underlying offenses and, therefore, warranting the
imposition of higher sentences, because the
relevant intent is an element of the offense
in regards to each crime. Again, however,

the Appeals Chamber did not find that
these errors warranted any reduction in the
overall sentences determined by the Trial
Chamber.
Laticia Sanchez, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote the judgment summary of The Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Renzaho. Susana SáCouto, Director
of the War Crimes Research Office, and
Katherine Anne Cleary, Assistant Director
of the War Crimes Research Office, edited
this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia
Four Former Khmer Rouge
Leaders Charged with Genocide
The Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) have confirmed the inclusion of charges of genocide in the case against four former Khmer
Rouge leaders currently in detention. Nuon
Chea, known as “Brother Number Two;”
Khieu Samphan, the ex-head of state; Ieng
Sary, the former foreign minister; and
Ieng Thirith, the former minister of social
affairs, were informed of the additional
charges during meetings in December
2009. The genocide charges refer specifically to the killing of Vietnamese people
and members of the Cham Muslim minority group. In early January 2010, the CoInvestigating Judges ruled that they would
not bring genocide charges relating to
another minority the Khmer Krom.
The four former officials are being
investigated in Case 002 at the ECCC.
The Co-Investigating Judges, You Bunleng and Marcel Lemonde, are expected
to decide by September 2010 whether to
indict the four former leaders and to settle
the final charges, if any. The genocide
charges have been added to earlier charges,
including crimes against humanity and
grave breaches of the Geneva Convention.
The only other case at the tribunal, Case
001 against Kaing Guek Eav (known as
“Duch”) ended in November 2009; Duch
was not tried for genocide.
Although the mass killings under the
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia between 1975
and 1979 are often referred to as genocide,
academics have long debated whether they
satisfy the legal definition. The 1948 UN
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines genocide as the
“intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group
as such.” The ECCC accepted the Convention’s definition of genocide for use in trials at the tribunal.
During its time in power, the Khmer
Rouge systematically executed or caused
the death of those they considered ideological enemies. The genocide charges in
Case 002 refer to the killing of members of
identified groups, which would fall under
the ECCC’s definition of genocide. However, there is some debate about whether
the regime had a specific intent to destroy
those groups or if the intent was to eliminate political opposition to the regime,
which included these ethnic and religious
groups. The definition adopted by the
ECCC does not recognize the destruction
of political groups as genocide.
In a filing to the Co-Investigating
Judges, defense counsel for Ieng Sary
asserted that the tribunal should use a
“purpose-based” approach to determine
intent in crimes of genocide rather than a
“knowledge-based” approach. A knowledge-based determination of intent would
only require that the perpetrators knew
their actions would lead to the destruction
in whole or part of a defined group, while
a purpose-based intent would demand that
the perpetrators have the destruction of the
group as a particular goal.
The exclusion of genocide charges in
relation to the Khmer Krom, ethnic Krom
from the Mekong Delta region in Vietnam,
could complicate an already intricate trial
process. The Co-Investigating Judges ruled
that the charges would not be brought for
procedural reasons. According to the ruling, the facts and geographic areas cited
by the Prosecutors and civil parties were
not included in either the introductory or
supplemental submissions by the Prosecutors, which is a requirement for expanding the investigation. The lawyers for the
Khmer Krom civil parties are expected to
appeal the decision.
Amanda Chace, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote this
column on the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia for the Human
Rights Brief.
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International Criminal Court
ICC Prosecutor Requests
Investigation into Kenyan
Post-Election Violence
On November 26, 2009, the Prosecutor
for the International Criminal Court (ICC)
Luis Moreno-Ocampo formally requested
that Pre-Trial Chamber II allow him to conduct an investigation into the post-election
violence that occurred in Kenya between
late 2007 and early 2008. In making the
request, Moreno-Ocampo for the first time
exercised his proprio motu powers as Prosecutor under Article 15 of the Rome Statute. Article 15 provides that the Prosecutor
can open an investigation and bring cases
against a State Party to the Rome Statute if
he is able to prove the existence of several
criteria.
Moreno-Ocampo structured his request
to demonstrate that the situation in Kenya
met all relevant articles of the Rome Statute. First, Moreno-Ocampo sought to
establish that the ICC has jurisdiction over
the events in Kenya by providing evidence
that the alleged crimes fit definitions in
Article 5 of the Rome Statute such as murder, rape, deportation, and other inhuman
acts constitute crimes against humanity.
Additionally, the events satisfy Article 11
because they occurred after the Rome Statute came into effect in Kenya on June 1,
2005, and they satisfy Article 12 because
they occurred on Kenyan territory.
Second, Moreno-Ocampo argued that
his request was admissible because Kenya
is unwilling and unable to prosecute the
matter itself as required by Article 17(1)
(a)-(c). As required by these provisions,
Moreno-Ocampo established that no investigations had been conducted by Kenyan
officials and none were likely to be undertaken. In particular, the Kenyan Parliament
defeated a motion to establish a special
tribunal to investigate the violence and
also refused to refer the matter to the ICC.
Moreno-Ocampo argued that the events satisfied the requirements of Article 17(1)(d)
because the crimes are sufficiently grave
to merit ICC intervention. By the time a
power-sharing agreement was reached by
Mwai Kibaki and Raila Odinga in February
2008, there had been over 1,000 civilians
killed, 900 documented cases of rape, and
350,000 people displaced. In one particular
incident, between 17 and 35 people were
burned alive inside a church. Furthermore,

Kenyan organizations, like the Kenyan
National Commission on Human Rights
and the Waki Commission, have compiled
lists of individuals who may have directed
the attacks, and these lists include political leaders on both sides of the electoral
dispute.
Although the Court has not yet established what an investigation against the
interests of justice would be, MorenoOcampo argued that the investigation
would not be against the interests of justice
pursuant to Article 53(1). He reasoned in
his request that, to open an investigation
under Article 53, the Prosecutor must positively prove jurisdiction and admissibility,
but the ICC may refuse to grant leave if it
decides the investigation would be against
the interests of justice. Moreno-Ocampo
stated that no such conflict is apparent
from available evidence, so the request
should be accepted.
Around the same time that MorenoOcampo submitted his formal request, he
made a general announcement calling for
victims of the violence to come forward
and share their accounts with the Prosecutor. He announced that the period for
victims to make statements would last until
December 21, 2009. This effort was complicated by issues such as how to provide
for the security of victims who come forward. As a result, Kenyans have requested
to extend the deadline and to disseminate
information on ICC procedures so victims
would be more aware of their rights in any
further proceedings.

Pre-Trial Chamber Declines to
Confirm Charges against Abu
Garda
On October 19, 2009, a confirmation
hearing began in the case of Prosecutor v. Bahar Idriss Abu Garda before an
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber. Abu Garda is the
Chairman and General Coordinator of Military Operations of the United Resistance
Front, a rebel group fighting the Sudanese
government. He is the first accused from
the Darfur situation to appear before the
ICC. The hearing addressed allegations
from a summons issued in May 2009
that Abu Garda commanded an attack on
peacekeepers of the African Union Mission
in Sudan (AMIS) at Haskanita in Northern
Darfur on September 29, 2007. As a result
of the attack, twelve AMIS soldiers were
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killed, eight were wounded, and AMIS
equipment was destroyed.
Specifically, the Prosecutor brought
three charges against Abu Garda: violence against life, in the form of murder,
whether committed or attempted; intentionally directing attacks against personnel,
installations, materials, units, and vehicles
involved in a peacekeeping mission; and
pillaging. ICC Prosecutor Luis MorenoOcampo explained at a press conference
that, while several attacks had been perpetrated against peacekeepers, charges were
filed against Abu Garda for the Haskanita
attack because of its far-reaching consequences. He said, “[W]ith the killings
[the peacekeepers] had to withdraw [from
Haskanita], leaving thousands of civilians
unprotected. The attack had consequences
for the delivery of humanitarian aid as well
as safety and security in the region.”
The purpose of the confirmation hearing was to evaluate whether the Prosecutor
had gathered sufficient evidence for the
ICC to find Abu Garda guilty if the case
proceeds to trial. First, opening statements
were made by the Prosecutor, Defense, and
four representatives of 78 identified victims who had applied. Next, the Prosecutor presented documentary evidence and
elicited testimony from three witnesses.
The Defense then had an opportunity to
challenge the Prosecutor’s evidence and
witnesses, and present its own. Defense
counsel sought to establish that Abu Garda
was not present in Sudan at the time of
the attacks and instead was traveling elsewhere in Africa on behalf of the Justice
and Equality Movement, another rebel
group with which he was formerly affiliated. Additionally, the Defense argued that
he did not order the attack and in fact
condemned it. After both sides presented
their evidence and witnesses, the victim
representatives had an opportunity to challenge anything that affected their clients’
interests. Finally, the Prosecutor, Defense,
and the victim representatives made closing arguments. The hearing concluded on
October 30, 2009.
On February 8, 2010, the Pre-Trial
Chamber entered a decision in which it
declined to confirm the charges against
Abu Garda. The Chamber concluded that
the attack on Haskanita was sufficiently
grave to merit ICC involvement because
the violence caused AMIS to decrease its
presence in the region and led to further
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instability. However, the Chamber did not
find that the Prosecutor had entered enough
evidence to create “substantial grounds” on
which to find Abu Garda guilty for the
crimes of which he was accused. The Prosecutor now has several options for how to
proceed. He can resubmit his request for
confirmation of charges with additional
evidence, or he can petition the Pre-Trial
Chamber for leave to appeal the decision
on the evidence as entered.
Paul Rinefierd, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote these
columns on the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.

ICC Appeals Chamber Reverses
Pre-Trial Chamber II Decision to
Release Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo
On December 2, 2009, the Appeals
Chamber for the ICC reversed Pre-Trial
Chamber II’s August 14 decision granting
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo interim release.
The Appeals Chamber unanimously agreed
that the Pre-Trial Chamber “misappreciated and disregarded relevant facts” in
concluding that substantial changes in
Bemba’s circumstances justified conditional interim release. More importantly,
the Court specified the conditions required
to grant interim release. It determined that
interim release must be a “single unseverable decision” that fully states the specific
conditions for release. In addition, the
Court required the identification of a host
country willing to take responsibility for
the defendant before interim release is
granted.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is a Congolese national charged with war crimes and
crimes against humanity for his actions as
military commander in the Central African
Republic in 2002 and 2003. He has been in
ICC custody since 2008 and will stand trial
April 2010.

Pre-Trial Chamber II determined in
August 2009 that Bemba no longer fulfilled the requirements of Article 58(1) of
the Rome Statute, which requires that a
defendant be kept in custody prior to trial
to ensure his appearance at trial. The reasons for keeping someone in custody are to
prevent harm to witnesses and victims and
to prevent the defendant from committing
additional related crimes. Judge Ekaterina
granted Bemba interim release pending a
host country’s willingness to take him. This
decision was based on reduced charges and
good behavior. However, without a willing
host country Bemba’s release was illusory
at best. The Appeals Court’s requirement
that a host country be identified in order to
consider interim release resolves the issue
that Bemba’s possible release created. The
Court stressed that without state cooperation, a conditional release would be ineffective. While Bemba will not be granted
release at this time, the Appeals Chamber’s
decision clarified the requirements needed
for interim release for defendants.

Second Congolese Warlord Trial
Resumes
The ICC trial of Congolese warlords
Germain Katanga and Matthieu Ngudjolo Chui resumed on January 26, 2010.
Originally set to start in September 2009,
the ICC decided to postpone the proceedings to allow for more investigation and
was then forced to postpone the proceedings again when Judge Christine Van den
Wyngaert was injured in a bicycle accident
on December 2, 2009. The Prosecutor v.
Katanga and Ngudjolo is the second trial
for the ICC and is a unique case that will
present many challenges for the Court.
William Pace, Convenor of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
explained that “the Court will deal with
two accused, two defense teams, multiple
charges, and more participating victims
than in the Lubanga trial.”

59

Germain Katanga and Matthieu Ngudjolo Chui are jointly accused of seven war
crimes and three crimes against humanity
committed in the village of Bogoro in the
Ituri district of the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) from January through
March 2003. According to Human Rights
Watch, Katanga and Ngudjolo purposely
attacked the village with the goal of eradicating the Hema population in the area. In
addition to attacking civilians, the defendants are charged with murder, rape, sexual
slavery, pillaging, destruction of property,
and using child soldiers.
Due to length of the proceedings and
the large numbers of victims, this case
is unique for the ICC and will be closely
followed in the DRC. The Rome Statute
of the ICC allows victims to actively participate in trial by voicing their concerns
and opinions in proceedings that affect
their personal interests provided they do
not violate the defendants’ rights to a fair
trial. In the Katanga and Ngudjolo trial,
the Court has granted victim status for 345
applicants; however, all except for a small
group of child soldiers will be represented
by a common legal representative. Paulina
Vega, Interim Director at the International
Justice Desk at the International Federation
for Human Rights, praises the courts for
allowing so many victims to participate in
the trial, but wonders if “a single legal representative for the larger group of victims
will not fail to guarantee their meaningful
participation.” Allowing victims to participate in the trial hopefully satisfies victims’
need for justice and closure, which are
important goals for the ICC. Although the
Katanga and Ngudjolo trial will present
numerous procedural challenges, hopefully
it will be fair and meet victims’ expectations as well.		
HRB
Rebecca Williams, a J.D. candidate at the
Washington College of Law, wrote these
columns on the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.

